Why is Putin usually blamed for all of Ukraine’s problems?
In the political and media space of Ukraine, the dilemma of who is the main cause of internal problems—external Russian aggression or, after all, corruption and weak state institutions
The rhetoric of accusations and the search for an “external enemy”
In the political and media space of Ukraine, the dilemma of who is the main cause of internal problems—external Russian aggression or, after all, corruption and weak state institutions—is always resolved in the same way: Putin is to blame for all problems!
Despite the fact that the real threat of an attack from Russia existed (and was neglected) from the very first hours of independence, those in power formed a narrative convenient for themselves:
“Do not criticize the authorities so as not to help Putin!”
“Do not talk about corruption—this plays into the enemy’s hands!”
Such rhetoric certainly does not consolidate society against the external enemy in any way, but in some sense “freezes” internal criticism, because any attempts to speak the truth about systemic shortcomings can be officially recognized as systematic work for the enemy and “undermining the unity of the country.”
Why did Ukraine refuse to recognize itself as the successor to the UPR?
On March 15, 1992, a significant event took place to confirm Ukraine’s historical continuity as a state: at the 10th extraordinary session of the Ukrainian National Council, a resolution was adopted to transfer the powers of the State Center of the Ukrainian People’s Republic (UPR) in exile to the Ukrainian authorities in Kyiv. The last president of the UPR in exile, Mykola Plaviuk, handed over the state regalia and presidential powers to Leonid Kravchuk.
This step was supposed to symbolize that Ukraine is not only the legal successor of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (URSR), but also of the Ukrainian People’s Republic of 1917–1920.
However… After 1992, neither Leonid Kuchma nor the subsequent Ukrainian presidents ever solidified this “longer history” in legislative acts or official documents, because not entirely, or maybe not at all, Ukrainian authorities explained this by fear of a possible escalation of the political crisis with Moscow.
Back then, a nationwide political logic was laid down: “Why provoke Russia into aggression?”
One way or another, no president has yet officially recognized the UPR as a legal precondition for an independent Ukraine.
2014: a war that has still not been recognized as a war
In 2014, Russia occupied Crimea and launched armed aggression against Ukraine, hiding behind purported “Ukrainian separatists” in the Donbas. The Ukrainian army, which, despite more than sufficient funding, had for years been sold off and dismantled, proved unprepared for large-scale resistance. No matter what anyone says, in the first months, it was the volunteer battalions, activists, and volunteers who “pulled through” the war.
Even then, it was necessary to raise the issue of punishing all those responsible for the fact that the Ukrainian army existed only on paper, while in reality all the money for its modernization and functioning was… but…
The official rhetoric boiled down to “one should not criticize the government of a warring country or speak about corruption so as not to play into Russian propaganda!”
In other words, at a time when it was necessary to stop the looting of at least the army, the main thesis of state policy was clearly formulated:
“First, we’ll fend off Russia, and only then will we talk about internal reforms!”
Thanks to this policy, instead of a radical fight against corruption, the state switched to “survival mode,” or “squeezing out” the last juices from the country. Under the label of fighting the enemy, top leadership brazenly pushed its own selfish interests, hiding behind patriotic slogans.
One way or another, the war that began in 2014 contributed to the growth of corruption. In particular, in the defense sector, where under the “secret” label, schemes to loot the state were established, which continued to undermine the army.
2019 elections: Whoever is not for Poroshenko (corruption) is an agent of the Kremlin?
In the 2019 presidential election, then-President Petro Poroshenko openly exploited the topic of war, constantly using patriotic rhetoric whenever possible (and even when not): “I am the only obstacle to the Russian threat!”
All attempts by opponents to point out large-scale corruption in his entourage (in particular, the “Svinarchuk–Hladkovskyi case” in the defense sector) were met with immediate accusations:
“This is helping the Kremlin!”
“All critics of Poroshenko are financed by Putin!”
“If Poroshenko is gone, Putin will immediately seize Ukraine!”
“Whoever does not vote for the incumbent president is a ‘Kremlin agent’!”
Poroshenko’s plan was aided by the Ministry of Information Policy (also known as the Ministry of Propaganda, or “MinStec”), which assured him that it had practically monopolized Ukraine’s information space, one way or another bribing all bloggers and “opinion leaders,” most often using grant aid from the United States and other countries.
Nevertheless, due to significant corruption in Poroshenko’s team, the result of the second round showed that 73% of voters supported Volodymyr Zelensky.
Although many interpreted this figure as “trust in a new face” or that Ukrainians consciously chose Zelensky, in reality, this outcome was the public’s protest against Poroshenko’s corrupt system!
Moreover, Zelensky promised to “break the old corruption schemes,” and society had hopes for a fundamental renewal.
New “faces” = new corruption schemes. What changed after 2019?
With the change of president, many young “specialists” from grant projects (in particular, BRDO) got positions in government agencies and even headed the government. A new cycle of promises about “quick and painful reforms” and total digitization began.
Nevertheless, numerous journalistic investigations (the programs Bihus, Skhemy, Nashi Hroshi) indicated that:
The old corruption schemes have not gone anywhere; they have simply been headed by new people.
The “young faces” became even more adept and cynical in looting the state, as if their grant projects were merely preparatory courses for large-scale corruption.
And the rhetoric “don’t criticize so as not to harm the country” was used as before.
In fact, under Zelensky, the scenario was fully repeated:
“First we will defeat the enemy, and then we will deal with abuses of power and corruption!”
2022: Did anything change after the full-scale invasion?
On February 24, 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The Armed Forces and all citizens faced an unprecedented challenge; many regions fell under shelling, millions of people became refugees, thousands died.
And again, in the first most difficult and most critical days of the war, it was the volunteer battalions, activists, and volunteers who “pulled Ukraine through!”
The entire country turned into one large Territorial Defense Battalion and stood in the enemy’s way!
But…
On the one hand, such a situation requires maximum consolidation: any internal turmoil can be dangerous. On the other hand, society expected that under wartime conditions, the authorities would:
Introduce the repeatedly promised “zero tolerance” for corruption
Immediately and unconditionally punish officials exposed in abuses “on blood”
Strengthen oversight of budget funds, in particular, international aid
However, reality turned out otherwise, as evidenced by a number of corruption scandals in the Ministry of Defense and other state institutions: inflated purchases of food, cases of bribes for military contracts, etc.
All this understandably caused public outrage and demotivated the soldiers.
But again, in response to the public’s demand, the usual argument was heard:
“Public criticism now plays into Putin’s hands. We cannot rock the country from within when the enemy is at the doorstep!”
Journalists were even openly asked to stop investigations and publications about corruption in Ukraine, because they supposedly harmed our image, and donors refused to continue providing assistance.
When the situation became extremely tense, Zelensky even announced an initiative to equate corruption with treason under martial law, but the bill was never adopted.
The difficult 2024 and the question of elections
In 2024, against the backdrop of the full-scale war, discussions began that political life could not function fully while martial law continued. However, rumors emerged in various political circles about the inevitability of elections.
Zelensky was even offered a way out of the issue by transferring power to the prime minister’s office, for which Andriy Yermak was suggested.
However, the President’s Office rejected this proposal.
At the rhetorical level, familiar narratives again appeared:
“Putin above all wants to remove Zelensky from office—he dreams of changing power in Ukraine and holding elections to destabilize the situation!”
Thus, any idea of elections or the resignation of the current government was portrayed as “undermining the state’s interests” and “collaboration with Russia.” So anyone advocating for elections or the president’s early departure, especially calling for the severe exposure of corruption, was automatically categorized as a “Kremlin agent.”
As before, the rhetoric “The West advises us to unite, not to criticize” became a universal shield against questions about why prominent corrupt officials so often avoid real accountability.
Corruption or “treason”? How to tell the difference?
Since 2014, there have been discussions about whether to classify the actions of top corrupt officials in the defense sector as treason, which is in principle logical.
Moreover, the public was constantly outraged: “If soldiers die because of someone’s scheme, isn’t that treason?”
At the same time, in practice, not a single high-ranking official has received a sentence commensurate with “treason.”
The same situation was repeated in 2022–2023:
Everyone remembers the purchases of eggs for the Armed Forces of Ukraine at incredible prices, and investigations in the area of military contracts.
Everyone saw the dismissals and “demonstrative” detentions of certain officials. But that’s where the show ended. Because usually, bail follows, and there is no clear outcome of the cases in court.
For all three years, civil society demanded: “Equate corruption with treason!”
But the authorities again and again responded by the same template:
“Any major corruption scandal harms Ukraine’s image internationally and splits the unity of those who support us, so we must remain calm and wait until the war is over for effective resistance to Russia!”
Why is Putin always “to blame” in exposing corruption, and what does it threaten?
Russia is carrying out armed aggression against Ukraine and poses a direct existential threat to the entire world. However, precisely this fact often became, in the rhetoric of our officials, a convenient opportunity to divert attention from:
Systemic corruption in government offices
The actual absence of real punishment for officials who abuse their powers
The increase of oligarchic influence and “informal” groups of influence in wartime
The logical question: Why aren’t those who loot the army during war considered to be helping Putin?
The story from 1992 (when, out of fear of Moscow, succession with the UNR was never established), the events of 2014 (when society was accused of “rocking the boat” instead of seriously fighting corruption and building the army), the 2019 elections (when critics of opponents were labeled “working for the Kremlin”), and the 2022–2023 scandals show that the thesis “Putin is to blame for everything” has become universal for our officials and has been repeated for many years. Most often, it appears precisely when there is a need to replace honest dialogue about internal problems.
Why is this dangerous?
It slows down reforms: the fear of harming national unity and state interests has turned into the acceptance and justification of inaction and corruption.
It suppresses criticism: thanks to this narrative, anyone who disagrees with the official position can be accused of “collaboration with the Kremlin” and even imprisoned.
It undermines citizens’ and Western partners’ trust: if corruption investigations are never carried through to verdicts, Western partners become increasingly skeptical.
Conclusion: can everything really be blamed on “Russia”?
Today, Ukraine is fighting a deadly battle for its very existence, and the factor of external threat is indeed decisive. However, this does not in any way relieve the authorities of responsibility for:
Transparency and accountability, especially when receiving massive amounts of international military and financial aid.
Punishing corrupt officials—since internal abuses do more damage than enemy shelling by corroding the state from within.
Preserving democratic principles: when every anticorruption criticism is in turn called “treason,” the country risks sliding into authoritarian practices.
The rhetoric “Putin is to blame for everything,” just like “anticorruption investigations harm state interests,” is manipulative. Russian aggression is undeniable, but it cannot serve as a universal alibi for those who, profiting from the war, exploit state funds or evade responsibility for their own inaction. Only the combination of defending against the external enemy and systematically eradicating corruption can guarantee that Ukraine emerges from the war as a strong democratic state rather than remaining hostage to the rhetoric of fear and excuses.
So, the central issue facing Ukrainian society is how to prevent the real threat from Russia from continuing to serve as a cover for unpunished corruption. The war must become a reason for maximum transparency, not for more of the usual silencing of problems on which the future of the state depends.
Trump’s demand: hold elections in 2025
The debate about how and when to hold elections under wartime conditions and how to combine military mobilization with guarantees of democracy is still ongoing. But it is already important to understand that the real enemy of Ukraine—the Russian aggressor—cannot once again become a convenient excuse for those who see Ukraine as a feeding trough for their own interests. If this cycle is not broken, then corruption, not only Putin, will remain a constant real source of problems and risks to Ukrainian statehood.
History confirms that successful defense against an external enemy is possible only when society is consolidated on the principles of transparency and justice. So in reality, it is impossible to justify everything with the bogeyman “because Putin will attack,” especially in the third year of a full-scale war.