Peace Rhetoric as a Form of Escalation: Analysis of Putin’s Diplomatic Strategy in the Context of War Termination Theory
There is an obvious contradiction between the theoretical predictions of the behavior of mixed autocracies in crisis situations and the observed escalation of peaceful rhetoric by the Russian leadership. Applying H. E. Goemans’ war termination theory to the Russian-Ukrainian war, one can see that the strengthening of Putin’s peace proposals does not contradict the logic of “doubling down in the face of defeat” but, on the contrary, represents its manifestation in the diplomatic sphere against the backdrop of failed military mobilization.
H. E. Goemans’ war termination theory asserts that leaders of “mixed autocracies” tend to double down in the face of defeat, since the perception of failure is unacceptable for them. However, observations of Vladimir Putin’s behavior in 2024–2025 reveal an obvious contradiction: instead of exclusively military escalation, the Russian leader demonstrates unprecedented activity in peace rhetoric.
Thus, we obtain a paradox: the escalation of peace proposals becomes not a retreat from the logic of doubling down but its adaptation to conditions where traditional forms of military mobilization have collapsed.
Theoretical Foundation
Goemans’ Theory and Mixed Autocracies
According to Goemans’ theory, leaders of mixed autocracies, who are simultaneously oriented toward both the elite and the masses, often double down in the face of defeat. This behavioral model is explained by the fact that for such regimes the perception of defeat constitutes an existential threat.
In the case of the Russian-Ukrainian war, after the failure of the “Blitzkrieg” in 2022, Putin indeed chose escalation: he mobilized reservists, involved North Korean soldiers, and resorted to nuclear threats. This fully corresponded to theoretical predictions.
The Problem of Negotiation Space
The theory also predicts that a negotiation space for ending a war opens only when neither side demands more than the other can accept. In the Russian-Ukrainian war there has been no stable negotiation range, since each side still does not want or cannot accept even the minimum conditions demanded by the other.
Empirical Data: Mobilization Failure
Recruitment Statistics 2024–2025
Analysis of recent data reveals a dramatic decline in the effectiveness of Russian mobilization:
2024: recruitment fell sharply. In the first quarter, budget reports show the payment of only 73,400 federal signing bonuses, extrapolating to about 295,000 new recruits for the year.
Inflation of official data: in 2023, the most “fruitful” year for new “volunteers,” budget execution data show that only 345,400 people joined the army — significantly fewer than the 540,000 claimed by the government.
Loss-to-recruitment ratio: Russia was losing 40,000 soldiers per month in the last quarter of 2024 and the beginning of 2025, while monthly recruitment barely matched or fell short of the losses.
Demographic Constraints
The natural decline of Russia’s population amounted to 596,200 people by the end of 2024, which is 20.4% higher compared to 2023. Emigration due to the war and mobilization is estimated at more than 900,000 people. These factors create structural constraints for further mobilization.
Escalation of Peace Rhetoric
Chronology of Peace Proposals 2024–2025
June 2024: Putin outlined conditions for a ceasefire, including full transfer of occupied territories and Ukraine’s neutrality.
May 2025: Putin proposed direct negotiations with Ukraine in Istanbul, declaring readiness for talks “without preconditions.”
March 2025: In response to a 30-day ceasefire proposal from the U.S. and Ukraine, Putin declared support for the “principle of ceasefire” but set out a series of issues.
August 2025: In a meeting with U.S. envoy Witkoff, Putin proposed a two-phase plan to end the war in exchange for occupied regions of Ukraine.
Tactical Goals of Peace Rhetoric
Analysis shows that the escalation of peace proposals has specific tactical goals:
Splitting the Western coalition: attempts to shift responsibility for prolonging the war onto Ukraine and its allies.
Time for regrouping: using diplomatic processes to gain respite and prepare for the next stage.
Managing domestic perception: demonstrating to the Russian population that Russia is “for peace,” while the West obstructs settlement.
Historical Parallels: Lessons of 1939
The Kremlin’s rhetoric about peace recalls the propaganda schemes of the Soviet period. In September 1939, when German troops had already occupied Poland, Pravda actively spread the narrative that Germany sought peace while England and France obstructed settlement.
Tactical similarities:
Role inversion: the aggressor positions itself as a peacemaker, while the victim and its allies are portrayed as obstacles to peace.
Shifting responsibility: “we wanted to agree, but we were not understood.”
Legitimization through ‘necessity’: aggression is presented as a response to “misunderstanding” or “provocations.”
Concrete parallels 1939–2025:
Göring “praised Hitler’s love of peace” — Putin regularly speaks of readiness for negotiations.
Zhdanov wrote that “England and France do not want an equal treaty with the USSR” — today’s rhetoric claims “the West obstructs settlement.”
The article “On the Internal Causes of Poland’s Military Defeat” — criticism of the “Kyiv regime.”
This historical analogy confirms that Putin’s peace proposals should be regarded not as a genuine aspiration for settlement but as a tactical element of a propaganda campaign aimed at splitting the Western coalition and justifying continued aggression.
Peace Rhetoric as a Form of Escalation
Rethinking “Doubling Down”
In conditions of failed traditional mobilization, Putin adapted the strategy of doubling down to the diplomatic sphere. Peace rhetoric becomes an instrument of:
Diplomatic pressure on Ukrainian leadership and Western allies.
Preparing conditions for future military escalation under the guise of “peacekeeping” efforts.
Maintaining initiative in the face of military setbacks.
Alignment with Theoretical Model
Such behavior fully corresponds to the logic of mixed autocracies according to Goemans:
Unacceptability of defeat: Putin’s regime cannot afford to admit failure.
Strategic adaptability: changing tactics while maintaining strategic goals.
Use of all resources: shifting from military to diplomatic means of pressure.
Proof through Contradiction
Analysis of the conditions of peace proposals confirms that they are a bluff:
Unacceptability for Ukraine: all proposals demand capitulation in the form of territorial transfer and renunciation of sovereignty.
Maximalist nature: demands do not diminish, and sometimes even expand compared to previous proposals.
Absence of compromises: none of the proposals includes reciprocal concessions from Russia.
Parallel Military Activity
Despite peace rhetoric, Russia continues to:
Intensify long-range attacks on Ukrainian cities.
Recruit foreign mercenaries and North Korean soldiers.
Increase drone production (79,000 Shahed-type drones planned for 2025).
Conclusions
The escalation of Putin’s peace rhetoric does not contradict Goemans’ theory of mixed autocracy behavior but represents its manifestation under the conditions of failed traditional mobilization.
Key conclusions on Putin’s “peace” strategy:
Strategic adaptability: inability to continue military escalation led to a shift to the diplomatic sphere.
Maintenance of maximalist goals: peace proposals do not imply real compromises and are in fact demands for capitulation.
Tactical character: peace rhetoric is used as a tool of pressure and disorientation of the opponent, not as a genuine desire for peace.
Confirmation of theory: Putin’s behavior fully corresponds to the model of a mixed autocracy leader who doubles down in the face of defeat but adapts the forms of this effort to available opportunities.
Thus, the intensification of Putin’s peace rhetoric should be regarded not as a sign of readiness for compromise but as a form of diplomatic escalation under conditions of military constraints. This has important implications for shaping an adequate response by Ukraine and its allies.